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Abstract. Supply chain coordination through contracts has been a burgeoning area of re-
search in recent years. In spite of rapid development of research, there are only a few struc-
tured analyses of assumptions, methods, and applicability of insights in this ﬁeld. The aim
of this paper is to provide a systematic overview of coordinating contracts in supply chain
through highlighting the main concepts, assumptions, methods, and present the state-of-the-
art research in this ﬁeld.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The supply chain management paradigm asserts that when making decisions, the
eﬃciency of the whole system should be taken into consideration. When decision
making is decentralized, i.e. decisions are made by independent agents comprising the
chain, optimization of system’s total eﬃciency might be discordant with the agents’
incentives. Therefore, coordinating the agents’ decisions becomes a major issue.
By viewing a supply chain as nexus-of-contracts (Wang and Parlar, 1994),
i.e. a group of rational agents interacting with each other according to pre-speciﬁed
rules, an improved supply chain management is achieved by designing appropriate
contracts coordinating the agents’ decisions. This is the main objective of research on
coordinating contracts. Although contracts have been studied in law, economics, and
marketing disciplines, their study in SCM takes a rather diﬀerent approach.
“What distinguishes SCM contract analysis may be its focus on operational
details, requiring more explicit modeling of materials ﬂows and complicating
factors such as uncertainty in the supply or demand of products, forecasting
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and the possibility of revising those forecasts, constrained production capacity,
and penalties for overtime and expediting” (Tsay et al., 1999).
A contract speciﬁes mechanisms for governing the interaction contingencies
among agents. It manifests the exchange of promises regarding the actions which
are to be done in time. Necessarily, contracts must be enforceable, i.e. the agents’
refrainment from fulﬁlling their promises should be ruled out (or made highly im-
probable). For a contract to be enforceable, its terms (the mutual promises), should
be verifiable by an enforcing body. However, the veriﬁability of contract’s terms is
dependent on the enforcing body. If a contract’s terms are veriﬁable by a court of law,
that contract would be a legal contract.
Supply chain contracts are not always required to be legal. Several papers in the
literature consider contracts among independent agents that are divisions of the same
company and a higher level manager can verify the rendition of lateral promises (e.g.
Chen (1999), Lee and Whang (1999), and Zhang (2006)). Nevertheless, the process
of contract design should explicitly point out the verifying ability of the enforcing
agent. Two approaches to veriﬁcation are detectable in the literature: direct, and
indirect. In direct veriﬁcation, the conditions regarding the fulﬁllment of contract
terms must be observed. In indirect veriﬁcation, the aforementioned conditions may
be inferred. In reality, the veriﬁcation process is a mixture of the two approaches. An
example of direct veriﬁcation is the delivery of the ordered products from a supplier
by a retailer. The retailer can observe, i.e. count, the number of products received.
Indirect veriﬁcations are achieved when a certain action is considered to be necessary
(or self-enforcing) for a rational agent. For example, a manufacturer can verify that
if the market selling price is greater than the total production cost and salvage value,
the retailer would satisfy market demand as much as it can.
The study of supply chain contracts is an interdisciplinary research area. For
the most part, it is a synthesis of inventory theory (e.g. Zipkin (2000)), game theory
(e.g. Owen (1995)), and contract economics theory (e.g. Brousseau and Glachant
(2002)). In spite of rapid development of research on supply chain contracting and
coordination, there are only a few structured analyses of the assumptions, methods,
and the implications of insights in this ﬁeld. Relevant examples include Li and Wang
(2007), Chan et al. (2004), and Gomez-Padilla et al. (2005).
The aim of this paper is to provide a general overview of coordinating contracts
in supply chain through highlighting the main concepts, assumptions, methods, and
presenting the state-of-the-art research in this ﬁeld. We intend to provide a non-
technical framework encompassing the most important components of these theories.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the concept of coor-
dination in SCM contracting is elaborated. Section 3, provides a classiﬁcation scheme
for coordinating contract in supply chain. Some of the well-known contractual mech-
anisms in SCM are introduced in Section 4. Section 5 contains a review of recent
literature based on the proposed classiﬁcation scheme. Section 6 discusses several is-
sues with regard to coordinating contracts in SCM and ﬁnally, Section 7 introduces
some directions for future research in this area.
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2. COORDINATION AND SUPPLY CHAIN CONTRACTS
As a rule of thumb, the eﬃciency of a centralized decision making system is superior to
that of a decentralized system, all other things being equal. A well-known justiﬁcation
of the latter is the double marginalization conundrum (Spengler, 1950). The incompat-
ible incentives of agents in a decentralized system make the decisions that are optimal
for the agents sub-optimal for the whole chain. In the decentralized supply chain liter-
ature, coordination refers to the equivalence of agents’ individually-optimal decisions
with the optimal decisions of the (centralized) supply chain1. The incompatibility of
incentives in decentralized supply chains stems from the fundamental characteristic
of agents, i.e. rationality. The rationality of individuals implies that each agent seeks
to maximize its own utility, and moreover, each agent is able to calculate its optimal
decisions, which lead to the maximization of its utility, given the information it has2.
As the result, the agents do not undertake the supply chain optimal decisions unless
they know that those decisions are also optimal for themselves.
In order to coordinate a supply chain, a contract must transform the individuals’
utility functions in a way that the supply chain optimal decisions would also be optimal
for the individuals. However, this is only one necessary condition for a contract to be
coordinating. Another necessary condition is that a contract cannot be forced upon
individuals; they must willfully accept the contract. The literature contains at least
two approaches to formulating the acceptability condition of a contract. The ﬁrst
approach implies that a contract is acceptable if it leads to the utility of each agent
being above a certain acceptable level for that agent. These levels can be interpreted
diﬀerently, e.g. reservation proﬁts, opportunity costs, outside options, or status quo
utilities. The second approach demands that not only should an acceptable contract
guarantee minimum amounts of utilities to the agents, but it also must divide the
extra utilities in a fair manner among them3.
Cachon (2003) states three conditions that a coordinating contract should meet:
(1) with a coordinating contract, the set of supply chain optimum decisions should
be a pure Nash equilibrium; (2) it should divide the supply chain profits (utilities
in general) arbitrarily among the agents; and (3) it should be worth adopting. The
ﬁrst condition is concerned with the transformation of individuals’ utility functions.
Although this deﬁnition does not directly speciﬁes the acceptability condition, the
second condition implies that if a contract can divide the supply chain proﬁts among
agents in any manner, at least one of those division schemes could be acceptable to all
1 Note that in the centralized supply chain literature, coordination refers to the derivation of supply
chain’s optimal decisions (see Thomas and Griffin (1996) for a literature review of coordination in
centralized supply chains). Therefore, in centralized supply chains, coordination is in fact a global
optimization problem, while in the decentralized supply chains the latter is a mechanism design
problem.
2 For further discussions on the concept of rationality and proposed critiques see Osborne and
Rubinstein (1994).
3 One approach to fairness is to consider it as the correspondence between the bargaining powers
(yet another hard-to-define concept) and the individuals’ utilities. See Nagarajan and Sosic (2008)
for elaboration on this issue.
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agents4. Unfortunately, the criteria for assessing the third condition are rather vague,
but it could be taken as the combination of other qualitative acceptability conditions
yet to be formalized.
Alternatively, Gan et al. (2004) deﬁne coordinating contract as a contract which
the agents of a supply chain agree upon and the optimizing decisions of the agents un-
der the contract satisfy each agent’s reservation payoff [minimum acceptable utilities]
constraint and lead to Pareto-optimal decisions and Pareto-optimal sharing rule. This
deﬁnition formulates the acceptability condition according to the ﬁrst approach stated
earlier (satisfaction of minimum acceptable utilities). One drawback of this approach
is that it does not indicate how one contract should be agreed by the individuals in
cases where there exists multiple contracts with Pareto-optimal sharing rules which
satisfy the agent’s minimum acceptable utilities. Gan et al. (2004) also deﬁne flexible
coordinating contract as a coordinating contract such that by adjustment of some
parameters, it could lead to any Pareto-optimal sharing rule.
Despite the diﬀerent interpretations of acceptability condition of a coordinating
contract in Cachon (2003) and Gan et al. (2004), the fundamental notions in both
deﬁnitions are similar. That is, with the coordinating contract, agents’ optimum de-
cisions must be the same as the supply chain’s optimum decisions, and the contract
should divide the resultant payoﬀs among them so that all agents are satisﬁed and as
the result they would accept the contract. We provide two variations of the concept
of coordination:
– Weak Coordination: If a contract could achieve the equivalence of agents’ opti-
mal decisions (pure Nash equilibrium) and the supply chain’s optimal solution,
and at the same time it satisﬁes the minimum acceptable utilities for all agents,
then the contract is weakly coordinating.
– Strong Coordination: If a contract could achieve the equivalence of agents’
optimal individual decisions (pure Nash equilibrium) and the supply chain’s
optimal solution, and at the same time it could divide the total supply chain
payoﬀ in any manner among the agents, then the contract is strongly coordi-
nating.
The relationship between the two deﬁnitions is that if a weakly coordinating
contract is also ﬂexible, then it is strongly coordinating as well.
3. METHODOLOGY OF COORDINATING CONTRACTS
The purpose of this section is to provide a taxonomy of supply chain contracting
problems and an overview of methods used in analyzing the coordinating ability of
contracts.
4 For the cases with two agents, there is always an acceptable division schemes among all the possible
divisions. However, for the cases with more than two agents, this might not hold. In particular,
this definition does not address the possibility of coalition formation among the agents. We discuss
this issue further in Section 3.2.2.
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3.1. CLASSIFICATION OF PROBLEMS
Numerous parameters impact how contracts aﬀect collaborative performance of sup-
ply chain agents. However, in order to retain tractability, only a few of those pa-
rameters can be abstracted and investigated simultaneously in a model. The result
is a plethora of models with various combinations of parameters. Here, we present
a list of the most important classes of parameters which have been considered in the
literature.
3.1.1. SUPPLY CHAIN TOPOLOGY
A supply chain consists of several business entities (agents) with certain kinds of ﬂows
among them (such as material, information, and money)that can be represented by
a network. Despite the complex structure of an average-sized real world supply chain,
the contracting literature focuses on small chunks of such networks comprising of few
nodes (representing supply chain agents, e.g. companies) and the ﬂows between them.
In many cases, supply chain contracts are considered to be centered around a focal
node and the immediate predecessors and/or successors which form a hierarchy of
tiers. We refer to this aspect as supply chain topology. The common topologies in
supply chain contracting literature are as follows.
– Two-tier topology with two nodes:Majority of studies in the supply chain
contracting literature consider this topology. The nodes might represent a sup-
plier and a manufacturer, or a producer and a retailer, etc. This topology
resembles a bilateral monopoly.5 The well-known coordinating contracts for
supply chains mainly address this topology (see Section 4).
– One-tier topology with several nodes: The contracts with this topology
deal with horizontal collaboration among several independent agents that are
in the same supply chain tier (all retailers, or manufacturers for instance). The
collaboration is through pooling resources in order to balance the outstand-
ing demands and surplus resources. In sub-contracting literature, the ﬂow of
resources among any two agents are only in one way. However, in the trans-
shipment literature, the ﬂows are bilateral. Although the agents collaborate
with one another, still, they may compete over some aspects of their business,
e.g. order quantities (Rudi et al., 2001) or their market selling prices (Zhao
and Atkins, 2009). An important aspect of the supply chain models with this
topology is whether the collaboration among the agents happen prior to the
realization of the demand of afterwards.
– Two-tier topology with several nodes: The contracts with this topology
address the interactions among a focal node and several other nodes all being
located in an adjacent tier. Therefore this topology is comprised of either one
5 A bilateral monopoly consists of two vertically-dependent agents: an upstream supplier (a monop-
olist) that sells all its output to a downstream buyer (a monopsonist) that acquires all its supply of
an essential input from the monopolist. Their relationship is symmetric. Both have market power,
and neither can survive without the other; therefore, the agents necessarily deal with each other,
negotiate and conclude contracts, and settle prices and quantities (Ingene and Parry, 2004, p. 32).
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upstream node that supplies several downstream nodes, or one downstream
node that is being supplied from several upstream nodes. The nodes in the
same tier may compete with one another over the limited capacity of the other
tier’s resources (as in Cachon and Lariviere (1999)), or on market prices (as in
Deneckere et al. (1997)), etc. In more elaborate models the nodes in the same
tier are assumed to pool resources, e.g. Ulku et al. (2007).
– More general topologies Assuming more than two tiers in an independently
owned serial supply chain system will drastically increase the complexity of
analysis of coordinating contracts. To the best of our knowledge there are only
a few papers which consider these topologies. As an example, Zijm and Timmer
(2008) study the coordination problem in a three-tier supply chain with three
nodes. However, they assume separate contracts governing the interactions
between the node in adjacent tiers.
3.1.2. SUPPLY CHAIN ENVIRONMENT
The supply chain environment is the collection of external factors aﬀecting the supply
chains’ decisions. Some of the most relevant dimensions of supply chain environment
are as follows.
– Certainty/Uncertainty of environment: Usually, the uncertainty of sup-
ply chain environment refers to the market demands. Two broad categories are
deterministic and probabilistic market demands. Sarmah et al. (2006) review
the contracts with quantity-discount policies in deterministic demand environ-
ment. In deterministic systems, the coordination might pertain to the timing
of orders (Klastorin et al., 2002). The coordinating contracts with uncertain
market demand environment mostly consider continuous probability functions.
An example of coordination with discrete demand distributions is Zhao et al.
(2006) which consider a one-tier supply chain with two nodes and Poisson
demand arrival rates. Recently, Xu and Zhai (2010) study the general proper-
ties of coordination in a two-tier, two-node topology with fuzzy demands. The
other source of uncertainty about the supply chain environment is associated
with the supply chain’s input. The supply chain contracting literature has con-
sidered uncertain delivery times (e.g. Zimmer (2002)) and uncertain delivered
quantities (e.g. He and Zhang (2008)). The latter is also referred to as random
yield.
– Sensitivity of environment to supply chain decisions: In many supply
chain models, market demands are assumed to be sensitive to some decision
variables internal to the chain. Among others, the decision on market selling
price and marketing eﬀorts are the most addressed. For example, in addition to
choosing the order size, a retailer facing price-sensitive market demand should
also decide its selling price. This, in turn, aﬀects the coordinating ability of
the contract between the retailer and its supplier. Yano and Gilbert (2005)
and Chan et al. (2004) review the literature on supply chain contracts with
price sensitive market demands. When the market demand is aﬀected by the
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marketing eﬀort of downstream agent – which is unveriﬁable by the chain
– a coordinating contract should induce the supply chain’s optimal level of
marketing eﬀort. He et al. (2009) explore coordinating contracts for a two-
tier, two-node topology with both price and marketing eﬀort sensitive market
demand. Another factor that could aﬀect the market demand is the stock level.
Sajadieh et al. (2010) address the issue of coordination in the setting where
the amount of stock displayed to customers has a positive eﬀect on demand.
– Dependencies among agents in the same tier: The individual decisions
of agents who operate in the same supply chain tier may aﬀect each other.
These dependencies add another dimension to the complexity of models. Com-
petition, and correlated market demands are among factors that amount to
dependencies among agents in the same tier. Multiple nodes in a particular
tier, may compete over their market shares (when they are operating in the
same market), or supplier’s quotas (when the supplier’s capacity is restricted),
or ﬁll rates. Cachon and Lariviere (1999) investigate the supply chain coordi-
nation in the setting where the downstream agents compete over the limited
supplier’s capacity. Hartman and Dror (2005) analyze the cooperation among
many newsvendors with dependent market demands.
3.1.3. LENGTH OF CONTRACT
The length of a contract is the duration of time that the contracting agents are
assumed to uphold the contract. Therefore, the contract terms are not re-negotiated
during the length of a contract. This has a crucial eﬀect on modeling the underlying
supply chain problem. The eﬀective length of a supply chain contract can be compared
with the number of inventory replenishment periods. Accordingly, there is a close
aﬃnity between the length of a supply chain contract and the modeling approach.
The two main classes are:
– Single period models: A large number of supply chain contracts has been de-
vised for the single period supply chain model, i.e. the newsvendor model with
its numerous variations (Khouja, 1999). This family of supply chain models
is specially appropriate for the supply chains with perishable products, short
selling seasons, and long procurement lead-times. Nevertheless, the analytical
simplicity of single period supply chain models has given rise to the popularity
of contracts with one period length. Cachon and Lariviere (2005) outline several
coordinating contracts for the standard newsvendor model. Hu et al. (2007)
consider a single period model with limited and uncertain supplier’s capacity.
Cachon (2003) provides an excellent literature review on coordinating contracts
for this family of models. Cachon (2004) addresses coordination in a single-
period model with two replenishment opportunities for the downstream agent.
– Multi-period models: The multi-period models could simply be the combi-
nation of two consecutive newsvendor models (Barnes-Schuster et al., 2002),
or they might consist of several stocking periods. The multi-period models are
mainly based on the multi-echelon model of Clark and Scarf (1960). Among the
12 B. Hezarkhani, W. Kubiak
early papers that address the multi-period supply chain contracts is Cachon
and Zipkin (1999) which oﬀers a coordinating contract based on the end-of-
period inventory information at diﬀerent agents.
3.1.4. SUPPLY CHAIN DECISIONS
Among the numerous decision variables that are critical in managing supply chains,
the supply chain contracting literature commonly concentrates on those that are re-
lated to capacity, order size, market selling price, marketing eﬀorts, contract type,
lead times, quality, review period, and stocking policy. For a more detailed analysis of
supply chain decision variables see Tsay et al. (1999). Considering the multiplicity of
decision makers in decentralized supply chains, an important aspect of supply chain
decisions is the distribution of decision making responsibilities among supply chain
agents. Although traditionally some of decision variables are attributed to certain
supply chain entities, e.g. responsibility of deciding the order size to the downstream
agent (buyer), many cases with less conventional approaches have also been inves-
tigated in the literature. For example, in an insightful paper Lariviere and Porteus
(2001) assume that the upstream agent chooses the order size while the downstream
agent picks the buying price. Hence, the distribution of decision rights among supply
chain agents falls, at least partially, within the purview of the modeler.
Another aspect of this issue is related to the right of non-compliance among
supply chain agents. Generally, whenever one contracting agent requests something
from another agent, the latter may have the right not to comply with the former’s
request. In supply chain contracting literature, the allotment of compliance rights is,
in fact, the choice of the modeler. Cachon and Lariviere (2001) refer to this issue as
compliance regimen. Accordingly, there are two classes of compliance regimes: vol-
untary and forced. Cachon and Lariviere (2001) use these terms with respect to the
responsibility of a supplier to completely ﬁll the manufacturer’s order. In this con-
text, if the model gives the supplier the right to decide the fraction of manufacturer’s
order to deliver, then the system would be under voluntary compliance regimen. In
other words, under voluntary compliance regimen, an agent keeps the decision right
regarding the fulﬁllment of it received requests. Under the forced compliance regime,
on the other hand, an agent is obligated to fulﬁll the requests it receives.6 Therefore,
whether explicitly or implicitly, the compliance regiments of all the mutual promises
in a supply chain contract should be indicated. If a contract can coordinate a speciﬁc
supply chain settings under a voluntary-compliance regime, it could coordinate under
the forced-compliance regime as well. The opposite might not be the case.
3.1.5. CHARACTERIZATION OF SUPPLY CHAIN AGENTS
We have earlier alluded to rationality as an underlying characteristic of the agents.
Two other aspects of supply chain agents’ characteristics pertain to their utility func-
tions and attitudes toward risk. Utility functions reﬂect preferences of agents which,
6 It is because non-compliance would be penalized. The penalties (or other forms of threats) are
implicitly assumed to be large enough so that, in theory, non-compliance never occurs.
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in turn, determine their decision making criteria. In the supply chain contracting lit-
erature, it is conventional to assume that the utilities of agents are solely function of
monetary payoﬀs. That is, agents only care about the amount of proﬁt they make.
Nevertheless, there has been a recent trend in considering utility functions which re-
ﬂect agents’ social preferences as well. For instance, supply chain agents may also care
about fairness in a mutual business relationship (Cui et al., 2007). Other examples
include equity aversion and status seeking among agents (Loch and Wu, 2008).
In decision making in uncertain environments, the analysis of agents’ decision
making process requires the knowledge about their attitudes toward risk. Two types
of such attitudes have been considered in the literature: risk-neutrality, and risk-
aversion.7 For a risk-neutral agent, a certain payoﬀ of M is equally preferred as an
uncertain payoﬀ with the same expected value M , while a risk-averse agent prefers
the certain payoﬀ M . Hence, the objective of a risk-neutral agent is to maximize its
expected proﬁt (or equivalently to minimize its expected cost). While there is only one
measure for risk-neutrality, risk-aversivness can be reﬂected in many (theoretically in-
ﬁnite) ways. Among the objectives studied for risk-averse agents are the minimization
of variance of proﬁts (Chen and Parlar, 2007)), and the minimization of mean-variance
diﬀerence (Gan et al., 2004; Choi et al., 2008). Van Mieghem (2003) reviewed the lit-
erature on capacity investments considering the issue of risk-aversion. The general
characteristics of supply chain contracts with risk-averse agents are studied in Gan et
al. (2004).
3.1.6. INFORMATION STRUCTURE IN SUPPLY CHAIN
Information structure pertains to the agents’ knowledge in comparison to the collective
knowledge of agents in the supply chain. When all the information about supply
chain is simultaneously known by every agent, the information structure is said to
be complete or symmetric. On the other hand, if some agents have some information
that the other agents do not, the information structure is incomplete or asymmetric.
The pieces of information that are known only by an agent is that agent’s private
information.
In general, coordination under incomplete information is more complex than co-
ordination under complete information. One approach to deal with incomplete infor-
mation structure is to assume certain types of agents each with known characteristics
(c.f. Harsanyi and Selten (1972)). Although the agents do not know what types of
agents they are facing, the probability that an unknown agent is of a particular type
is assumed to be common knowledge. A coordinating contract in these settings is
comprised of a menu of contracts designed in a way that will make the agents with
private information to choose the only contract that result in the supply chain opti-
mum decisions. Therefore, a coordinating contract in incomplete information setting
will result in the truthful revelation of private information. Several papers study sup-
ply chain contracts under asymmetric information. Corbett and Tang (1999) assume
a two-tier, two-node setting with deterministic and price-sensitive demand function
7 To the best of our knowledge, risk-taking attitudes have never been considered in supply chain
contracting literature.
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where the upstream agent does not know the exact cost structure of the downstream
agent. They investigate the eﬀect of contracts with diﬀerent pricing mechanisms on
the overall eﬃciency of the chain. Corbett et al. (2004) study a supply chain with
two agents where the supplier does not know the retailer’s internal cost. Cachon and
Lariviere (2001) analyze a supply chain contracting problem where the information
regarding the probabilistic distribution of market demand is the private information of
downstream agent. Burnetas et al. (2007) introduce a coordinating quantity-discount
policy in a two-tier two-node topology where the upstream agent do not have the in-
formation regarding the demand distribution of downstream agent. The risk sharing
contract of Gan et al. (2005) can coordinate when the upstream agent does not know
how risk averse the downstream agent is. Burnetas et al. (2007) introduce an all-unit
discount policy that results in coordination of a two-tier two-node topology supply
chain in one period. Sucky (2006) considers a two-tier two-node setting in determinis-
tic environment under forced compliance regimen. Assuming that the upstream agent
is uncertain about the downstream agent’s cost structure, he shows that coordination
can be achieved through bargaining and with the help of side payments.
3.2. ANALYTICAL METHODS OF COORDINATING CONTRACTS
The ability of a contract to coordinate a supply chain is completely context-dependent.
We diﬀerentiate between contracts at two layers: the contract template, and the con-
tract setup. At the outer layer, the contract template provides a holistic view of
interactions among the agents involved in a contract and points out the variables
that the contract is based upon. The second layer, i.e. the contract setup, speciﬁes
the particular setup of contract variables for a given contract template. Consider the
famous wholesale-price contract as an example. The contract template declares that
the buyer should pay the seller a ﬁxed price for a unit of ordered product. The con-
tract setup, on the other hand, speciﬁes the exact unit price in the contract. Our goal
in this section is to answer two important questions: (1) How is a contract template
obtained? and (2) How is the coordinating ability of a contract analyzed?
In most cases, the contract templates are inspired by the structure of contracts
which are being used in practice. The alternative approach requires more creativity;
that is, the modeler invents a contract template by specifying the hypothetical in-
teractions among the agents. However, justifying the practicality of such a contract
template is rather challenging. Some of the most well-known contract templates are
introduced in the next section.
Game Theory is the fundamental tool for investigating the coordinating ability
of a contract, with speciﬁed template and setup, in a given supply chain setting. For
a brief review of related game theory concepts in supply chain contracts see Cachon
and Netessine (2006) and Chinchuluun et al. (2008). Accordingly, one should analyze
whether the contract can be setup so that it could induce all the agents to select the
supply chain’s optimal decision, and whether the resultant division scheme of supply
chain proﬁts are acceptable to them. We address the latter in two diﬀerent cases:
contracts between two agents, and contracts among more than two agents.
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3.2.1. CONTRACTS BETWEEN TWO AGENTS
When there are only two agents involved in a contract, assessment of coordinating
ability of a contract should concentrate on two issues: ﬁrst, the negotiation process
over a contract, and second, the eﬀect of the negotiated contract on agents’ decisions.
The most common procedure used in the literature is the Stackelberg game. This
approach simpliﬁes the analysis of negotiation process between the agents by assuming
that one agent (the leader) gives a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer, including the contract
template and setup, to the other agent (the follower) who has the right to either
accept or reject the oﬀer. The following steps are typically taken under the assumption
that the follower accepts the oﬀer only if it results in a minimum (expected) proﬁt
for him/her; (1) derive the followers optimum decision as a function of contract setup
variables; (2) check if the leader can oﬀer a contract setup that induces the follower to
choose the supply chain optimum decisions and provide the follower with its minimum
acceptable proﬁt level; and (3) if the result of the last step is positive, check if the
corresponding contract setup provides the leader with its minimum (expected) proﬁt
so that it actually oﬀers the contract.This approach is suitable for the situations where
the leader has signiﬁcantly more power and the interactions between the agents are
restricted. In general, the idea of the follower either completely accepting the contract
or wholly rejecting it without any further negotiations may seem too restrictive.
Another approach to analyzing the negotiation process over a contract is to con-
sider an explicit bargaining process. The bargaining process shall specify the exact
contract setup which leads to an acceptable split of the maximum (expected) supply
chain proﬁts. Two approaches which have been used in the literature are Strategic Ne-
gotiation (Rubinstein, 1982) and Axiomatic Negotiation (Nash, 1950). With Strategic
Negotiation (Sequential bargaining), after a contract has been oﬀered by an agent,
the other agent could oﬀer a new contract (counter-oﬀer) if it is no acceptable to the
latter. Considering the value of time (or agents’ patience), this bargaining process
has been proven (Rubinstein, 1982) to converge to a mutually acceptable contract
setup. For a review of the implementation of strategic negotiation in supply chain
contracts see Wu (2004). With Axiomatic Negotiation approach, the bargaining solu-
tion is developed by considering axioms that correspond to the desirable properties of
negotiation outcomes. The bargaining solution can be thought as the suggestion of an
unbiased arbitrator. Hence, a contract is proven to be coordinating if the underlying
negotiation problem has a solution. A recent example of implementation of this ap-
proach is Hezarkhani and Kubiak (2010a) which uses the generalized Nash bargaining
solution (Muthoo, 1996) in a transshipping supply chain. Nagarajan and Sosic (2008)
review the literature of bargaining and negotiation in supply chains.
3.2.2. CONTRACTS AMONG SEVERAL AGENTS
The analysis of coordinating contracts becomes more complex as the number of partic-
ipants in the contract increases. The principle approach to study the contracts among
several agents is the cooperative game theory. The cooperative game theory approach
to contracts provides mechanism for the distribution of total payoﬀ that is generated
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by the coalition of all supply chain agents, i.e. grand coalition. The acceptability of
a contract to the agents implies that not only should it provide each agent with its
minimum acceptable payoﬀ, but also it must eliminate the incentives for the agents to
form sub-coalitions and gain more proﬁts in that way. In other words, in the N -agent
case, the coordinating contract should meet some stability criteria with regard to the
distribution of grand coalition’s payoﬀ among the agents.
One of the most natural stability concepts is the concept of core (Peleg, 1995). If
a contract could distribute the grand coalition’s payoﬀ among the agents so that no
subset of agents could be better oﬀ by forming a sub-coalition, then that distribution
mechanism would be in the core of the corresponding cooperative game. However, it
might be the case that no such distribution mechanism can be found. Nevertheless,
there are alternative stability concepts that can be used in conjunction with other
solution concepts in cooperative game theory, e.g. Shapley value, nucleus, bargaining
set, etc (Owen, 1995). Slikker et al. (2005) study the coalitions of newsvendors who
can also pool resources through transshipments and show that the core of these class of
supply chain problems are non-empty. Ozen et al. (2009) provide a general framework
for cooperation under uncertainty. Brandenburger and Stuart (2007) study bi-form
games. The bi-form games are to model the supply chains wherein a set of agents
face individual and correlated decision making problems followed by a cooperative
stage. In a one-tier several agent topology, Anupindi et al. (2001) introduce an alloca-
tion rule in the core of the second stage transshipment game. Suakkaphong and Dror
(2010) provide insights, clariﬁcations, and strategic limitations regarding the alloca-
tion rule proposed by Anupindi et al. (2001). An alternative allocation rule has been
proposed in Sosˇić (2006) which redistributes the extra proﬁt generated through the
transshipments according to the Shapely value. Although the resultant allocation is
not necessarily in the core, it could result in the farsighted stability of the grand coali-
tion, i.e. the agents do not form sub-coalitions since they take into the consideration
other agents’ reactions as well. Chen and Zhang (2009) approach the transshipment
problem as a two stage cooperative game, and show that the problem of ﬁnding an
allocation in the core of N -agent transshipment game is NP-hard. Hezarkhani and
Kubiak (2010b) adopted the concept of pair-wise stability (Baiou and Balinski, 2002),
a non-cooperative solution concept derived from the matching problem in two-sided
markets, into the transshipment problem with many agents.
4. WELL-KNOWN CONTRACT TEMPLATES
IN SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT
The typical solution to incompatible incentives in a supply chain is for the agents to
agree to a set of transfer payments that modiﬁes their incentives, and hence mod-
iﬁes their behavior (Cachon, 1999). Additionally, the ﬂow of goods and materials
might also be the subject to modiﬁcation (as in a buyback contract). In this section,
we address some of the well-known contract templates in supply chain coordination.
We start with one of the most basic supply chain contracts, i.e. wholesale-price con-
tract, in a basic setting (single-period model with risk-neutral agents, independent
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demands, and symmetric information structure) and address the coordinating com-
ponents which can be added to it in order to achieve coordination in various settings.
4.1. WHOLESALE-PRICE CONTRACTS
In the simplest setting, the wholesale-price contract requires the buyer to pay a ﬁxed
and quantity-independent price to the seller for each units purchased. Although the
wholesale-price contract fails to coordinate supply chains in a simple two-tier topology
with two nodes, it is the most common contract in practice – perhaps because of its
simplicity.
In the standard newsvendor setting, two types of wholesale-price contracts are
possible. First, the downstream agent has to place orders before the realization of
uncertain market demand and the upstream agent provides products accordingly.
Second, the downstream agent can place the order after observing the actual market
demand while the upstream agent should prepare itself for meeting it in advance.
Although in both cases the integrated system is a standard newsvendor model, they
are diﬀerent with respect to allocation of risk between the two agents. Cachon (2004)
calls the ﬁrst type Push and second type Pull wholesale-price contracts. Lariviere
and Porteus (2001) analyze the properties of push wholesale-price contracts where
the upstream agent can satisfy all the downstream agent’s orders and it acts as the
Stackelberg leader oﬀering the wholesale price to the downstream agent who deter-
mines the order quantity. Note that with this contract, the seller gets a risk-less sum
of money before realization of market demand and the buyer faces all the risk associ-
ated with the uncertainty market demand. Cachon and Netessine (2004) analyze the
pull contract where the upstream agent has to decide its capacity level before receiv-
ing the downstream agent’s orders. As the authors conclude, both types of wholesale
price contracts fail to coordinate the supply chain. In fact, the only wholesale-price in
the push setting which induces the downstream agent to place the optimal centralized
order size, leaves the upstream agent with no proﬁt, thus, the wholesale price contract
cannot satisfy the acceptability condition of coordination, i.e. it cannot be setup to
provide arbitrary division of supply chain proﬁts.
4.2. CONTRACTS WITH DISCOUNT POLICIES
Discount policies, i.e. quantity-dependent unit prices, are well-known coordinating
components in supply chain contracts. There are several forms of discount policies;
see Dolan (1987) for a review. Discount policies are the main coordinating components
in supply chains with deterministic demand. Jeuland and Shugan (1983) address the
problem of coordination in the two-tier two-node topology and propose a coordinating
quantity-discount contract. As they show, there are several coordinating quantity
discount contracts which lead to diﬀerent split schemes for extra proﬁts generated
through cooperation. Klastorin et al. (2002) consider a two-tier supply chain with one
upstream agent and several downstream agents and show a discount policy that can
coordinate the ordering times of downstream agents so that the supply chain can save
holding costs at the upstream level. Cachon (2003) incorporates the quantity discount
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component in a standard newsvendor setting and demonstrates its coordinating ability
in a two-tier topology with two nodes. In his model, the mutually acceptable division
of supply chain proﬁts is determined by a Nash bargaining mechanism between the
two agents.
4.3. CONTRACTS WITH RETURN POLICIES
With the return policies the seller promises to compensate the buyer for unsold quan-
tities. One might ask why contracts with return policies are needed while quantity
discount contract are just as well coordinating. First, “buy-back payments play a very
important role in channel coordination when the multi-retailer setting is considered.
When retailers serve markets of diﬀerent sizes, the manufacturer can attain the proﬁts
of a coordinated channel only if he can charge diﬀerent wholesale prices to each outlet.
However, in the US such a practice is restricted by the Robinson Patman Act which
protects the retailers against price discrimination by the manufacturers. It is shown
that the buy-back payments for used products provide a second degree of freedom for
the manufacturer to diﬀerentiate the average wholesale price charged to each retail
outlet, and thereby attain the coordinated channel proﬁts in a decentralized setting”
(Debo et al., 2004). Second, with the return policies the upstream agent is also bear-
ing the risk associated with the market demand so the downstream agent prefers it
to a quantity discount contract with the same expected proﬁt.
The variations of return policies depend upon the amount of leftover inventory
which can be returned and the amount of compensation—the ratio of unit compensa-
tion fee to the original purchase price. Pasternack (1985) shows that in a newsvendor
setting with risk-neutral agents, the return policies that allow for full leftover return
and partial compensation can coordinate the supply chain.
Other variations of return policies are (1) unlimited return and full compensa-
tion, (2) limited return and full compensation, and (3) limited return and partial
compensation. In the newsvendor setting, Pasternack (1985) also proves that the re-
turn policies that allow for full return and full compensation cannot be coordinating.
In the same setting, Cachon (2003) shows that partial return and full compensation
cannot coordinate either, while partial return and partial compensation can. Su (2009)
study the impact of full returns policies and partial returns policies on supply chain
performance.
4.4. REVENUE SHARING CONTRACTS
In revenue sharing contracts, the downstream agent commits to return a pre-
negotiated portion of its realized proﬁts to the upstream agent. The successful imple-
mentation of these contracts are reported in the video rental industry (Cachon and
Lariviere, 2005).
The revenue sharing contract can also coordinate the price-sensitive newsvendor
setting (Cachon and Netessine, 2004). Qin and Yang (2008) consider a two-tier, two-
node topology and analyze the revenue sharing contract as a Stackelberg game and
conclude that in order to achieve coordination, the agent that keeps more than half the
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revenue should serve as the leader of the Stackelberg game. Yao et al. (2008b) study
a two-tier, three-node topology where the downstream agents compete over setting
the market selling prices. They combine the Stackelberg game among the upstream
and downstream agents and the Bayesian Nash game between the two downstream
agents and investigate the eﬀect of diﬀerent revenue-sharing contracts on supply chain
performance.
A particular case of the revenue sharing—widely known as consignment contracts
(Wang et al., 2004) – is the instance where the ownership of goods do not change with
their delivery to the downstream agent, i.e. the upstream agent remain the owner of
them. Then, the upstream agent pays the downstream agent a commission for each
sold item. Wang et al. (2004) investigate the performance of consignment contracts
when the demand is sensitive to the market selling price.
4.5. REBATE CONTRACTS
In rebate contracts, the upstream agent rewards the downstream agent for every
sold unit. Therefore, in some sense, the rebate policies are commensurate with the
return policies: while in buyback contracts the downstream agent is compensated for
unsold units, in rebate contracts the latter is rewarded for the sold units. Accordingly,
diﬀerent rebate policies can be implemented: (1) policies that reward for all sold units,
and (2) policies that reward for sold units only above a threshold. In a newsvendor
settings, Taylor (2002) shows that the second class of rebate policies can achieve
coordination. Chen et al. (2007) consider the rebate contract in a two-tier, two-node
topology with price-sensitive demands and ﬁnd that the mail-in rebates (which is
payed upon request) may beneﬁt the upstream agent while instant-rebates (which
includes every interaction) may not.
4.6. CONTRACTS WITH SIDE PAYMENTS
Although the notion of side payment has a clear deﬁnition in game theory8, its use
in supply chain contracting literature is some what inconsistent.9 We deﬁne side
payments as the lump-sum monetary transfers among the contracting agents which
are independent of amount of trade and used as compensation and incentive alignment
mechanisms. In order to clarify the issue consider two contracts introduced earlier: the
wholesale-price, and the revenue sharing contracts. In the wholesale-price contract,
the amount of money transferred from buyer to seller is a linear function of units
purchased. On the other hand, in the revenue sharing contract the downstream agent
pays the upstream agent a lump-sum of money after the realization of its proﬁts.
According to our deﬁnition, the latter is a side payment while the former is not.
Examples of side-payment contracts among two agents include two-part tariﬀ
(where limited side-payments are allowed, e.g. Zaccour (2008)) and option contracts
(e.g. Barnes-Schuster et al. (2002)). In general, the contracts that rely on allocations
8 In game theory terminology, side payment is defined as the exchange of a perfectly dividable
common good that is capable of transferring utility (Aumann, 2000).
9 For instance compare Rubin and Carter (1990) and Taylor (2002).
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of realized proﬁts, take advantage of side payments. Hence, almost all the contracts
with more than two contracting agents, which utilize proﬁt-allocation mechanisms, are
contracts with side payments. Although the inclusion of side payments in supply chain
contracts could facilitate the coordination, they may be infeasible in some situations,
e.g. in some cases they might be prohibited by law (Leng and Zhu, 2009).
5. LITERATURE REVIEW AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we classify the recent literature on coordinating supply chain con-
tracts. The classiﬁcation scheme has been explained in earlier sections. We have not
considered the papers wherein the analysis does not result in coordination. The lit-
erature review has been done through the extensive tables (Tables 1 and 2). In order
to summarize the information in the tables, we have used the following notations. In
the Topology column, the xT/yN represents the number of tiers and nodes of the
topology. For instance, 2T/2N represents two tiers with two nodes topology. In the
Contract Length column, x-p shows the number of periods in the model (n-p stands
for multiple-periods). In the Agent Characteristics column, Risk-N and Risk-A re-
spectively represent risk-neutral and risk-averse agents.
The large number of variables that can be included in analyzing the contractual
situation limits the comprehensiveness of this classiﬁcation scheme. Moreover, several
other important aspects of supply chain contracts cannot be quantitatively analyzed.
Some of those aspects are: applicability, i.e. the possibility of implementation of a
contract in a given real world context, verifiability, i.e. availability of mechanisms for
verifying the lateral promises stated in the contract, and ease of implementation, i.e.
the eﬀort which is required to apply a contract in real world settings. In fact, there
is no known measure to compare among several coordinating contract for speciﬁc
settings. Hence, although we have addressed several papers in the literature in Tables
1 and 2, it is not straightforward to compare the contracts that are proposed to
coordinate in similar situations.
One of the weak points of coordinating supply chain contracts is their sensitivity
to the context. In this respect, the over-simpliﬁcation of problem may result in serious
ﬂaws. In fact, the supply chain contracts which coordinate in a particular theoretic
setting (under certain simpliﬁcations), may lead to very diﬀerent results when im-
plemented in real world situations. Cachon and Kok (2010) show that well-known
coordinating contracts such as quantity-discount and two-part tariﬀs could worsen
the performance of supply chain when applied in a two-tier topology with multiple
competing suppliers. Accordingly, one should be very cautions when implementing
these insights into practice.
A common assumption in the supply chain contracting literature is that the
process of contracting does not have any signiﬁcant costs. However, there are several
costs associated with the contracting process, e.g. costs related to writing down the
contracts and their monitoring and enforcements costs. In addition, the literature
does not consider the costs that the contracting agents incur in order to collaborate
with each other.
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Many studies have shown that cooperation among supply chain agents requires
costly infrastructure for information sharing, process and resource coordination, and
performance measurements (c.f. McLaren et al. (2002)). Therefore, without consid-
ering such realistic costs, the practical beneﬁts of coordinating contracts would be
unclear and inconclusive. The research must ﬁnd the conditions under which addi-
tional proﬁts which result from implementing a coordinating contract are actually
signiﬁcant.
Despite the growing number of analytical studies on supply chain contracts, there
are only a few empirical studies aiming at validation of the theoretical predictions
in this area. In a laboratory study, Katok and Wu (2009) show that the eﬀect of
coordinating contracts on supply chain eﬃciency is smaller than what is predicted
analytically. On the other hand, the small number of empirical research papers in
this area is almost unanimously indicating that the actual decision making process
in supply chains are hugely inﬂuenced by bounded rationality, anchoring, experience,
and insuﬃciently adjusted heuristics (e.g. Schweitzer and Cachon (2000), Bolton and
Katok (2008), and Benzion et al. (2008)). Additionally, the empirical studies of sup-
ply chain contracts do not reach beyond the laboratory tests—perhaps due to the
sensitivity of necessary information.
6. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The opportunities for research on supply chain contracting and coordination are nu-
merous. In fact, the research on supply chain contracts is still in its infancy and
there is plenty of room for building upon the current research and expanding it. The
analysis of the literature reveals that most of the coordinating contracts require the
following preliminary conditions to start with: (1) rationality of the players, (2) ab-
sence of contracting costs, (3) complete knowledge structure, (4) risk neutrality, and
(5) proﬁt orientedness. However, most of these assumptions, if not all, do not pro-
vide an adequate realistic picture of the settings in which they ought to be applied.
Agents might not know how to optimize or they may not have the suﬃcient compu-
tational power. The information sharing among the agents is very limited. Agents’
behavior is opportunistic and there are various types of agents with regard to their
utilities. Therefore, unless the gap between the theory and the practice does not close,
the insights achieved from the research will be questionable. Among the possibilities
for future research in this area are: (1) incorporating the under-analyzed aspects of
supply chain contracting, e.g. veriﬁability, compliance, etc; (2) reﬁning the deﬁnition
of acceptability in coordinating contracts; (3) considering more general utility func-
tions of supply chain members in order to capture realistic decision making criteria;
(4) investigating more complex supply chain topologies; and (5) strengthening the
usefulness of theoretical insights through empirical and case-based studies.
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